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Notes 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION:  ARE THE 
FEDERAL RULES KEEPING UP WITH 
(INTERNET) TRAFFIC? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Territorial boundaries have traditionally related to personal 
jurisdiction because the sovereign entities from which courts derive 
power are defined according to geographical borders.1  However, 
because the United States is a republic comprised of sovereign states, 
these boundaries implicate federalism concerns.2  In the words of de 
Tocqueville,”[t]he aim of the legislator in confederate states ought 
therefore to be to render the position of the courts of justice analogous to 
that which they occupy in countries where sovereignty is undivided.”3  
Federal courts regularly encounter this tension, as they must resolve 
controversies without infringing on state sovereignty or citizens’ due 
                                                 
1 Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 85 
(1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4, at 56-57 (1982)); Kendrick D. 
Nguyen, Note, Redefining the Threshold for Personal Jurisdiction: Contact and the Presumption of 
Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 253, 262 (2003) (noting that territorial limits for jurisdiction “were 
built around the concept that state governments had territorial power over persons and 
things within their boundaries”). 
2 See generally ALAN BRINKLEY, AMERICAN HISTORY: A SURVEY Ch. 6 (11th ed. 2003) 
(describing the formation of the government).  By the late eighteenth century, Americans 
became dissatisfied with the Confederation’s instability.  Id. at 159.  When forming the 
Confederation, Americans were concerned with state sovereignty, and they avoided 
creating a powerful national government.  Id.  The new government, created in 1787 by the 
Constitution, is a federal republic, which is similar to a confederacy, but it vests more 
power in the federal government.  Id. at 163. 
3 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 148 (1969).  The Continental 
Congress had adopted the Articles of Confederation in 1777, because Americans were 
concerned with the instability of state governments.  BRINKLEY, supra note 2, at 148-149.  
The Articles of Confederation provided for a national government, and Congress was its 
only institution.  Id. at 149.  Even so, under the Articles, Congress’s power was greatly 
limited: It lacked power to regulate when problems occurred between states or to enforce 
its decisions on the states.  Id. 
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process rights.4  Thus, exercising jurisdiction over defendants can be an 
obstacle to a federal court resolving a dispute.5     
Jurisdictional questions concern whether a court has the power to 
decide a case.6  In order to issue a valid judgment, a court must be able to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.7  Personal jurisdiction, 
or in personam jurisdiction, refers to a court’s power to bring a person 
before the court in a case.8  Determining whether a court has personal 
jurisdiction is important because allowing suits to proceed in improper 
forums may result in financial hardship for defendants, hostile triers of 
fact, and application of substantive law less favorable to defendants than 
the law of other states.9  Therefore, although jurisdiction is a procedural 
issue, it has substantive consequences.10  
                                                 
4 BRINKLEY, supra note 2, at 163 (noting that one of the main concerns in the colonies 
was sovereignty).  This concern with sovereignty led the framers to distribute power 
between the state and national governments.  Id.  According to James Madison, “in 
strictness, [it is] neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both.”  
Id. 
5 Jurisdiction refers to subject matter jurisdiction or to personal jurisdiction.  Subject 
matter jurisdiction concerns whether a federal court can hear a particular kind of case.  See 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367 (2000) (providing for federal court subject matter jurisdiction 
based on type of claim).  In order for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction, the 
question must arise from a federal law or the Constitution, or the parties must have diverse 
citizenship and meet the required amount in controversy.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) 
(providing for federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) 
(providing for diversity jurisdiction in federal courts when the parties are diverse and the 
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (providing for 
supplemental jurisdiction over claims that share a common nucleus of operative fact with 
the original claim).  Subject matter jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Note.  For a 
discussion of subject matter jurisdiction, see ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, 
JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 2-5 (3d Ed. Lexis 2002). 
6 Andrew J. Zbaracki, Comment, Advertising Amenability: Can Advertising Create 
Amenability?, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 212, 214 (1994). 
7 Nguyen, supra note 1, at 255.  Usually, jurisdiction is undisputed when courts exercise 
jurisdiction over in-state defendants.  Id. (noting that territorial sovereign power confers the 
authority to exercise jurisdiction).  The main concern in personal jurisdiction questions is 
whether a court can assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.  Id. 
8 Zbaracki, supra note 6, at 214; see Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 
102-03 (1987) (noting that even if due process under the Fifth Amendment were met, the 
district court could not exercise jurisdiction over the defendants unless they were subject to 
service of process); Delong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 847 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (noting that before a court can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the 
defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state and the forum must have a 
statute enabling the court to serve summons on the defendant). 
9 Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, in ESSAYS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 198 
(1965) [hereinafter State-Court Jurisdiction].  Personal jurisdiction analysis has been 
criticized recently because it involves uncertainty for the parties and expenditure of 
resources on preliminary issues instead of on the merits of controversies.  See Lilly, supra 
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In analyzing jurisdiction, courts have traditionally considered the 
fairness of subjecting a defendant to suit in the forum state.11  This 
fairness question has always been sensitive to technological 
                                                                                                             
note 1, at 108 (noting that personal jurisdiction is litigated often but remains unsettled); see 
also Ruckstul v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 731 So. 2d 881, 887 n.5, 889 n.7 (La. 1999) 
(describing lower court and federal court responses to the Asahi decision); Robert C. Casad, 
Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1593 (1992) (stating that 
lack of clear guidelines leads to confusion, unclear results, and unpredictability); Walter W. 
Heiser, A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 
915 (2000) (“[T]he doctrine today is unwieldy, incoherent, and unpredictable.”); Martin H. 
Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: Due Process and Constitutional Theory 
After Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 686 (1991) (noting disagreement on 
the Supreme Court regarding the analysis producing uncertain results); Linda Sandstrom 
Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619, 1620 (2001) 
(“The Court’s imprecision . . . creates both theoretical and practical problems.”); Flavio 
Rose, Comment, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The “But For” Test, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
1545, 1545 (1994) (“Personal jurisdiction is widely regarded as . . . problematic, uncertain, 
and murky . . . .”). 
 Further, because jurisdiction can be raised on appeal, the question also consumes the 
time of appellate courts.  See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Omni 
Capital Int’l, Ltd., 484 U.S. 97 (1987); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 
(1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 
(1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 
(1984); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 
84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
10 These substantive consequences raise the fairness concerns of due process.  Wendy 
Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer 
Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 508-09 (1987) (asserting that personal jurisdiction is 
substantive, although other commentators assert it is procedural); Lee Scott Taylor, 
Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1163, 1168-69 (2003) (noting that predictability concerns due process and stating that in 
choice-of-law doctrine, the value of predictability has been consistently recognized); Sean 
K. Hornbeck, Comment, Transnational Litigation and Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign 
Defendants, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1389, 1393 (1996) (addressing issues associated with 
transnational litigation).  But see Gary A. Haugen, Personal Jurisdiction and Due Process 
Rights for Alien Defendants, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 109, 117 (1993) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court 
has . . . suggested that procedural fairness is the idea that connects due process and 
personal jurisdiction.”); Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global 
Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
917, 922 (1995) (noting that personal jurisdiction should be viewed only as a subpart of 
procedural due process). 
11 See infra Part II.A (tracing the Supreme Court’s expansion of personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence based on advancements in technology).  Fairness refers to convenience or 
sovereignty.  See infra note 142.  For purposes of this Note, only the fairness aspect is 
relevant because this Note is only addressing federal question cases.  Thus, the Fourteenth 
Amendment sovereignty limits do not apply to the federal courts on purely federal issues.  
See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
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advancement.12  Technological changes create problems in personal 
jurisdiction analysis because technology strains territorial principles by 
connecting people across borders, such as through the Internet.13  
Consequently, the boundaries used to determine whether a court can 
assert personal jurisdiction are antiquated in the context of modern 
technology.14   
Technology over the past decade has dramatically changed, 
providing new ways for people and businesses to interact with each 
other.15  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) should 
accommodate this new technology through amending Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4 (“Rule 4”), which provides for jurisdiction based on 
service of process.16  In amending Rule 4, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Advisory Committee (“Advisory Committee”) should 
consider technological advancements that make litigation less 
burdensome for defendants.17  This Note suggests one way for the 
Advisory Committee to embrace the effects of electronic capabilities:  
reconsider territorial power espoused by Rule 4(k) because current 
technology renders these traditional boundaries of state borders 
irrelevant to fairness concerns in federal question cases.18   
                                                 
12 See infra Part II.A (tracing the Supreme Court’s expansion of personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence based on advancements in technology). 
13 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 178 (noting that courts should not be bound by 
territorial limitations); Frank Conley, :-) Service with a Smiley: The Effect of Email and Other 
Communications on Service of Process, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 407, 407 (1997); Taylor, 
supra note 10, at 1163-64 (“[T]he increasing pressure that technolog[y] . . . bear[s] on 
jurisdictional doctrine further complicates matters . . . .”). 
14 Nguyen, supra note 1, at 254 (suggesting using history to determine when the next 
expansion of jurisdiction is appropriate).  The history of jurisdiction demonstrates the 
doctrine’s expansion according to social, economic, and technological advancements.  Id. at 
273. 
15 See BRINKLEY, supra note 2, at 931; Conley, supra note 13, at 407; Nguyen, supra note 1, 
at 266. 
16 See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to Rule 4(k) in federal question cases). 
17 See infra notes 96-98 (explaining the process for amending the FRCP). 
18 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).  For a general discussion of Rule 4, see JOHN J. COUND ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 182-83 (8th ed. 2001).  Rule 4(k)(1)(A) allows 
federal courts to assert jurisdiction over defendants in a state when that state’s courts could 
exercise jurisdiction.  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); see COUND ET AL., supra, at 182-83.  Section B 
applies in impleading third parties or joining necessary parties and permits service outside 
the territorial boundaries of the forum state within a one hundred mile radius of the 
courthouse.  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B); see COUND ET AL., supra, at 182-83.  Section C governs 
service pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act, and section D acknowledges Congress’s 
authorization of nationwide service with specific statutes.  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C), (D); see 
COUND, ET AL., supra, at 182-83.  The second part of the rule, 4(k)(2), functions as a limited 
federal long-arm statute for federal question cases when defendants lack sufficient 
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Part II of this Note presents the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, 
focusing on the fairness prong of the minimum contacts analysis.19  This 
Part also explains how changes in technology have led to expanding 
personal jurisdiction by the United States Supreme Court and in the 
FRCP.20  Then, this Part describes some of the new technology available 
in courts that may ease a defendant’s burden of litigating in an out-of-
state forum.21  Part III analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in expanding jurisdiction and the Advisory Committee’s 
previous decisions to amend Rule 4.22  The analysis focuses on previous 
expansion of personal jurisdiction based on the notion that it would not 
be too unfair to allow courts jurisdiction over defendants in light of 
technology and transportation conveniences of the day.23  Finally, in Part 
IV, this Note proposes an amendment to Rule 4, which would provide 
for nationwide jurisdiction in federal question cases based on Rule 4(k) 
service of process in courts where parties have access to electronic filing 
and other technological advancements.24  In selecting the proposed 
amendment that would best accommodate current technology, this Note 
considers the objectives of the Rules and past expansions and concerns 
with amendments and proposals.25    
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION:  THE HORSE AND 
BUGGY MEETS THE AUTOMOBILE 
Before a court can exercise jurisdiction over parties in a civil action, 
three requirements must be met:  (1) The parties must have notice of the 
judicial proceeding; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the parties; 
and (3) subject matter jurisdiction must be authorized and consistent 
with the Constitution.26  In federal court, plaintiffs must establish that the 
                                                                                                             
minimum contacts with a single state.  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2); see COUND ET AL., supra, at 
182-83. 
19 See infra Part II.A. 
20 See infra Part II.A–B. 
21 See infra Part II.C. 
22 See infra Part III. 
23 See infra Part IV.  Although Part II mentions the purposeful availment prong, this Note 
is primarily concerned with the fairness inquiry of the personal jurisdiction analysis. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 See infra Part IV. 
26 Brian B. Frasch, Comment, National Contacts as a Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction over 
Aliens in Federal Question Suits, 70 CAL. L. REV. 686, 689 (1982); see, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (requiring notice “reasonably calculated” to 
inform parties of the proceeding); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (noting 
that the defendant must be amenable to service of process and have minimum contacts 
with the forum state); see also 28 U.S.C. §1331 (2000) (providing for federal question 
jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (providing for diversity jurisdiction). 
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court has jurisdiction over the defendant.27  The process of establishing 
personal jurisdiction begins with a statute from the relevant forum that 
authorizes jurisdiction.28  In federal courts, this statute is Federal Rule of 
                                                 
27 Bradley W. Paulson, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over Aliens: Unraveling Entangled 
Case Law, 13 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 117, 119 (1990); see also Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler 
Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999) (“When responding to a Rule 
12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.”); Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 
1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, a plaintiff must 
“demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction”); Bally Exp. Corp. v. Balicar, 
Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Normally it is well established that the plaintiff 
must prove jurisdiction exists once it is challenged by the defendant.”). 
28 See infra Part II.B (discussing Rule 4, which functions as the federal long arm statute). 
 State legislators enacted long-arm statutes, which allow state residents to sue 
nonresident defendants.  Zbaracki, supra note 6, at 216 (noting that there are three 
categories of long arm statutes).  The statutes permit jurisdiction by enumerated provisions 
or to the full extent of due process.  Id.  Seven states passed the broadest type of statutes, 
those which extend the courts’ jurisdiction to the limits of due process.  Id; see, e.g., ARIZ. R. 
CIV. P. 4.2(a); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 410.10 (West 2004) (“A court of this state may exercise 
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United 
States.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.065 (Michie 1998); N.J. CT. R. 4.4-4(e); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12 § 2004(F) (West 1993 & Supp. 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1997); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 5-1-107 (Michie 2003).  To meet statutory requirements, jurisdiction must comport 
with the constitutional protection.  Zbaracki, supra note 6, at 216. 
 Other statutes enumerate situations that constitute adequate contacts with the forum 
state.  Id. at 216-17; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (Michie2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 52-59b (West 1991 & Supp. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (1999 & Supp. 2004); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (West1994 & Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (1982 & Supp. 
2004); HAW REV. STAT. § 634-35 (1993 & Supp. 2003); IDAHO CODE § 5-514 (Michie 2004); 
IND. R. TRIAL PROC. 4.4; IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 
(1994 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (Banks-Baldwin 1993); MD. CODE ANN. 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103 (2002 & Supp. 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West 
2000 & Supp. 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 506.500 (West 
2003); MONT. R. CIV. PROC. 4B; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §510:4 (1997 & Supp. 2004); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2004); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 302(a) (Consol. 
2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (West 2004); TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4.28.185 (West 1998 & Supp. 2005); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 56-3-33 (Michie 1997); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).  Indiana uses the following enumerated long 
arm statute: 
(A) Acts serving as a basis for jurisdiction.  Any person or organization 
that is a nonresident of this state, a resident of this state who has left 
the state, or a person whose residence is unknown, submits to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action arising from the 
following acts committed by him or her or his or her agent: 
(1) Doing any business in this state; 
(2) Causing personal injury or property damage by an act or omission 
done within this state; 
(3) Causing personal injury or property damage in this state by an 
occurrence, act or omission done outside this state if he regularly does 
or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of 
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Civil Procedure 4, and it operates as a federal long-arm statute.29  Next, 
courts determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant would be constitutional under the Due Process Clause, as 
required by Pennoyer v. Neff.30  The modern test used in analyzing 
personal jurisdiction comes from International Shoe Co. v. Washington31 
and requires purposeful availment by the defendant and fairness in 
bringing him to court in the forum state.32  Federal courts and state 
                                                                                                             
conduct, or derives substantial revenue or benefit from goods, 
materials, or services used, consumed, or rendered in this state; 
(4) Having supplied or contracted to supply services rendered or to be 
rendered or goods or materials furnished or to be furnished in this 
state; 
(5) Owning, using, or possessing any real property or an interest in 
real property within this state; 
(6) Contracting to insure or act as a surety for or on behalf of any 
person, property or risk located within this state at the time the 
contract was made; 
(7) Living in the marital relationship within the state notwithstanding 
subsequent departure from the state as to all obligations for alimony, 
custody, child support, or property settlement, if the other party to the 
marital relationship continues to reside in this state; or 
(8) Abusing, harassing, or disturbing the peace of, or violating a 
protective or restraining order for the protection of, any person within 
the state by an act or omission done in this state, or outside this state if 
the act or omission is part of a continuing course of conduct having an 
effect in this state. 
IND. R. TRIAL PROC. 4.4. 
 Additionally, some statues use enumerated long-arm statutes, but they are interpreted 
to extend jurisdiction to the limits of due process.  See Zbaracki, supra note 6, at 217-18; see, 
e.g., ALA R. CIV. P. 4.2; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-1-124 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. 13-423 (2001 & Supp. 
2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §5/2-209(c) (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201 
(West 1991 & Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 704-A (West 2003); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. §§ 600.701-600.735 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19 (West 
2000 & Supp. 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (1995); N.D. R. CIV. P. 4(b); OR. R. CIV. P. 4; 42 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (West 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (Law Co-op. 2003); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-7- (Michie 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214 (1994); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-27-24 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 855 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 
(Michie 2000 & Supp. 2004). 
29 See infra Part II.B (discussing Rule 4); see also supra note 28 (discussing state long-arm 
statutes). 
30 95 U.S. 714 (1878); see infra text accompanying notes 50-54. 
31 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see infra text accompanying notes 57-62. 
32 See infra Part II.A.  The focus of this Note is on the fairness inquiry in the personal 
jurisdiction analysis.  In order for personal jurisdiction to be established, the defendant 
must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945); Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1191 (5th Cir. 
1985); Paulson, supra note 27, at 119; Rose, supra note 9, at 1545 (noting that minimum 
contacts are either general or specific).  “Minimum contacts” refers to a defendant’s 
purposeful availment of the forum so that he should reasonably foresee being subject to 
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courts both apply the minimum contacts analysis to determine whether 
jurisdiction may be constitutionally exercised.33 
The law of personal jurisdiction has largely developed through 
United States Supreme Court decisions and Advisory Committee 
modification of the FRCP.34  Part II.A addresses the past effects of 
technology on personal jurisdiction, noting how personal jurisdiction has 
been expanded by the Supreme Court in keeping with advancements in 
communication and transportation.35  The purpose of this Part is not to 
explain the development of the minimum contacts doctrine but to 
demonstrate that the fairness inquiry has historically responded to 
technological change.36  Next, Part II.B describes previous and proposed 
                                                                                                             
suit there.  Nguyen, supra note 1, at 258; see World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286 (1980).  Defendants may purposefully avail themselves of the forum through 
advertising, marketing, and using distributors there.  Nguyen, supra note 1, at 258; see 
Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 Personal jurisdiction can be divided into two categories, general jurisdiction and 
specific jurisdiction.  Rose, supra note 9, at 1549.  General jurisdiction exists if contacts are 
continuous and systematic.  Id.  Specific jurisdiction exists when the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum are related to the action, purposeful availment is shown, and jurisdiction is 
reasonable.  Id. 
 Corporate defendants and individual defendants are subject to the minimum contacts 
test.  See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) (holding 
individuals subject to personal jurisdiction); Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320 (holding a 
company subject to personal jurisdiction). 
33 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 177 
(1993).  The focus of this Note is on federal court jurisdiction.  See infra Part II.A (tracing 
United States Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases); see also infra note 36 (listing 
federal circuit court cases identifying a circuit split regarding the purposeful availment 
analysis). 
34 See infra Part II.B-D. 
35 See infra Part II.C. 
36 There are two inquiries in the personal jurisdiction analysis, purposeful availment and 
fairness.  See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. 102; Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. 462; World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286.  This Note is only concerned with the fairness inquiry.  
Therefore, Part II traces personal jurisdiction through history and considers how changes in 
technology have led to greater fairness in asserting jurisdiction over defendants.  See infra 
Part II.A.  It is beyond the scope of this Note to trace the development of the purposeful 
availment analysis. 
 For more information on the purposeful availment analysis and circuit split, see 
generally Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publ’g., 327 F.3d 472, 480 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“[I]nstead of undertaking the time-consuming task of analyzing the facts under all three 
approaches, and then being left to select an approach based upon the end result, we make 
clear today our preference for Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce ‘plus’ approach . . . 
and conduct the remainder of our analysis accordingly.”).  Compare Vermuelen v. Renault, 
U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Because jurisdiction . . . is consistent with 
due process under the more stringent ‘stream of commerce plus’ analysis adopted by the 
Asahi plurality, we need not determine which standard actually controls this case.”), with 
Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (determining that contacts were 
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amendments to Rule 4 based on technology available to society and 
examines the purpose of the prior amendments or proposals.37  Finally, 
to illustrate possibilities for easing litigation burdens of nonresident 
defendants, Part II.C describes technology currently available to all 
federal courts.38   
A. Past Effects of Technology on Jurisdiction:  “Start Your Engines” 
Generally, federal court personal jurisdiction is limited by state 
territorial boundaries, which also limit state court jurisdiction.39  
                                                                                                             
insufficient to confer jurisdiction and applying Justice O’Connor’s analysis).  But see Ruston 
Gas Turbines v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1993) (reversing a district court’s 
jurisdiction decision because the district court had relied on the stream of commerce plus 
analysis); Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(“Because the Court’s splintered view of minimum contacts in Asahi provides no clear 
guidance on this issue, we continue to gauge . . . contacts with Texas by the stream of 
commerce standard as described in World-Wide Volkswagen and embraced in this circuit.”); 
Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The dimension of the 
‘stream of commerce’ doctrine now divides the Supreme Court.”); DeMoss v. City Market 
Inc., 762 F. Supp. 913, 918 (D. Utah 1991) (applying the World-Wide Volkswagen standard 
due to the Supreme Court’s disagreement over the proper test and noting the Tenth 
Circuit’s agreement); Abuan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (D. Guam 1990) 
(attempting to reconcile both parts of Asahi with World-Wide Volkswagen); Curtis Mgmt. 
Group v. Acad. of Motion Pictures Arts & Scis., 717 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (S.D. Ind. 1989) 
(applying World-Wide Volkswagen); Hall v. Zambelli, 669 F. Supp. 753, 756 (S.D. W. Va. 
1987) (applying World-Wide Volkswagen while noting the confusion created by Asahi); 
Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp. 769, 776-77 (D. Kan. 1987) (noting that the Asahi 
court was evenly divided on the stream of commerce theory and following it). 
 Although several circuits seem to be undecided on whether they expressly adopt one 
opinion or apply all of the opinions, the Eighth Circuit has applied the two conflicting 
opinions.  See Richard M. Elias, In Search of a Broader Stream of Commerce Theory: The Eighth 
Circuit Streams Past Inconsistencies in Favor of Equitable Results, 67 MO. L. REV. 99 (2002); see 
also Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1994); Gould 
v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992); Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, 
Ltd., 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990). 
37 See infra Part II.B. 
38 See infra Part II.D. 
39 Howard M. Erichson, Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question 
Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1123 (1989); see HAZARD & TARUFFA, supra note 
33, at 176; see also CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 528 (noting that the federal courts did 
not have to be bound by territorial boundaries of states). 
 The exceptions to this limitation are federal statutory provisions extending 
jurisdiction nationwide, the “bulge rule” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(B), and through 
federal statutes authorizing jurisdiction.  Erichson, supra, at 1122-23; see, e.g., Commodity 
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 13a-1, 13a-2(4), 18(b) (2000); Arbitration Act Award 
Confirmation, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) (providing that 
nationwide service of process applies only if justice requires bringing other parties before 
the court); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000) (providing for anti-trust actions against corporations); 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2000); Federal Trade Commission administrative subpoenas, 15 
U.S.C. § 49 (2000); Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
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Defining power according to state boundaries was efficient after the 
founding of the United States because citizens considered each state to 
be its own sovereign nation.40  Then, most citizens of one state did not 
travel to other states,41 and citizens of different states rarely interacted.42  
In this type of society, territorial boundaries of states effectively limited 
personal jurisdiction.43 
However, as society became more connected, Congress passed the 
Full Faith and Credit Implementing Act of 1790,44 which required states 
to respect judgments of other state courts.45  Thus, before Pennoyer v. 
Neff, state court jurisdiction was challenged under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.46  A judgment from one state was valid in another state 
                                                                                                             
§§ 77 v(a), 78aa (2000); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (2000); 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (2000); Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (2000); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1965 (2000) (providing for nationwide service of process only if justice requires 
bringing a party outside the district before the court); Interpleader, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 
2361 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) (2000) (Bivens actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (2000) (lien 
enforcement); 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (2000) (receiver property actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (2000) 
(shareholder actions); 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (2000) (interstate commerce laws), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001 
(2000) (interstate commerce laws). 
 State courts exercised personal jurisdiction over defendants within the territorial 
borders of the state when the defendant was served with process.  Robert T. Mills, Personal 
Jurisdiction over Border State Defendants: What Does Due Process Require?, 13 S. ILL. U. L.J. 919, 
922 (1989); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); State-Court 
Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 202 (stating that the presence theory “may be attributable to the 
quasi-criminal origin of most common law personal actions,” the common law idea that a 
judgment is a basis for “immediate levy against the defendant’s person or his land,” and 
“the insistence on local settlement of land disputes”).  Further, the presence theory allows a 
judgment to be satisfied without concern for whether other jurisdictions will recognize its 
validity.  State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 203; see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k) (providing for 
jurisdiction when defendants are served within the territory, within a one hundred mile 
radius of the courthouse, or in interpleader cases). 
40 HAZARD & TARUFFA, supra note 33, at 174 (comparing states to nation-states in the 
international community); Nguyen, supra note 1, at 262 (noting that a connection to other 
states was only through “a vague concept of federalism”). 
41 Nguyen, supra note 1, at 262. 
42 HAZARD & TARUFFA, supra note 33, at 176 (“[L]itigation occurred between residents of 
the same locality.”); Nguyen, supra note 1, at 262. 
43 HAZARD & TARUFFA, supra note 33, at 176; Nguyen, supra note 1, at 262. 
44 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (“[R]ecords and judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same 
full faith and credit  in every court within the United States . . .  as they have by law or 
usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken.”). 
45 Id.; Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813) (construing the Full Faith and Credit 
Act of 1790); Nguyen, supra note 1, at 263.  For a discussion of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, see Harold L. Korn, The Development of Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States: Part I, 
65 BROOK. L. REV. 935, 959-63 (1999). 
46 Paul C. Wilson, A Pedigree for Due Process?  Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 
56 MO. L. REV. 353, 381 (1991); Nguyen, supra note 1, at 263; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 
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when the court deciding the case had personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant based on his consent or physical presence for service of 
process.47  Still, some states qualified or denied judgments of other states 
if they found the jurisdictional reach excessive.48  However, as interstate 
activity increased, litigation between residents of foreign states also 
increased, resulting in inconsistent exercises of personal jurisdiction.49    
The Supreme Court finally resolved this inconsistency with the 
Pennoyer decision in 1878, which recognized due process as a limit on 
jurisdiction.50  Since then, courts have acknowledged that the Due 
Process Clause protects defendants from improper exposure to 
jurisdiction.51  The Pennoyer Court also referred to international law 
                                                                                                             
(requiring that “Full Faith and Credit . . . be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State”); D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 174-75 
(1850). 
47 Wilson, supra note 46, at 381.  Courts obtained jurisdiction over defendants through 
other means when enforcement by other states was not required.  Id. 
48 Korn, supra note 45, at 973; Nguyen, supra note 1, at 263.  Some state courts considered 
state due process in asserting jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.  Nguyen, supra note 
1, at 263.  Moreover, due to the inconsistent approaches, states ignored valid judgments of 
other states.  Id. 
49 Nguyen, supra note 1, at 264 (noting that the personal jurisdiction inquiry did not 
provide the necessary consistency or predictability for the developing corporate society of 
the 1800s). 
50 HAZARD & TARUFFA, supra note 33, at 176 (noting that the modern rule is based on the 
Due Process Clause); Nguyen, supra note 1, at 264. 
51 Taylor, supra note 10, at 1166; see also State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 204.  In 
Pennoyer, the Supreme Court set out the traditional circumstances under which a court 
could exercise jurisdiction over the defendant including consent, presence, domicile, and 
quasi in rem jurisdiction.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).  Dicta in Pennoyer 
identified the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as the source of the territorial 
boundary within which service of process could confer jurisdiction over an unconsenting 
defendant.  Id. at 733; Nguyen, supra note 1, at 257. 
 Although since Pennoyer the Court has consistently identified the Due Process Clause 
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as the constitutional limitation on jurisdiction, it 
relied on interstate federalism in World-Wide Volkswagen.  CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, 
at 135 (“[P]rinciples of interstate federalism [are] embodied in the Constitution.”) (quoting 
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)).  However, in Insurance 
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, the Court readjusted its approach and 
relied on the Due Process Clause.  CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 135; see Ins. Corp. of 
Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n. 10 (1982).  Although interstate 
federalism restricts states’ jurisdiction, it is no longer a due process concern.  CASAD & 
RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 136 n.216 (noting that it is an indirect limitation based on the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause). 
 Likewise, while some lower courts had restricted jurisdiction based on the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court rejected this theory in Calder v. Jones.  Id. at 136; see Calder 
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).  Considering the chilling effects of out-of-state litigation 
was “double counting.”  CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 136 (noting the Court’s 
concern for First Amendment restrictions complicating the minimum contacts inquiry). 
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principles and held that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction . . . 
over persons and property within its territory [but that] no State can 
exercise direct jurisdiction . . . over persons and property without its 
territory.”52  The Pennoyer approach resulted in greater consistency and 
predictability for jurisdiction, and it can be viewed as the Supreme Court 
making jurisdiction compatible with the advancements of the nineteenth 
century.53  Although the Court still used the territorial approach with 
state boundaries, this approach was effective because at that time, 
society transacted business on a local level.54  
Improvements in transportation in the twentieth century made 
travel between states more convenient and less time consuming, 
resulting in increased interstate commercial activity.55  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court has considered the technological changes since Pennoyer 
in its steady expansion of the physical boundaries within which personal 
jurisdiction can be exercised over defendants.56   
                                                                                                             
 Similarly, other constitutional restrictions from the Commerce Clause were also 
applied by a few courts.  Id. at 137; see, e.g., Davis v. Farmer’s Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 
312 (1923).  However, these challenges have been uncommon because the due process 
standards announced in International Shoe include any potential burden on interstate 
commerce.  CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 137.  But see Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of 
the Constitutional Law of Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 20, 94-101 (1990) (arguing that the Constitution should generally not limit 
state court jurisdiction); Roger Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849 (1989) (arguing that limits on jurisdiction should be based on the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
52 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722; HAZARD & TARUFFA, supra note 33, at 174 (explaining that 
states function like nation-states in an international community); see Keith H. Beyler, 
Personal Jurisdiction Based on Advertising: The First Amendment and Federal Liberty Issues, 61 
MO. L. REV. 61, 122-23 (1996) (noting that previously jurisdiction was a Full Faith and 
Credit issue); Nguyen, supra note 1, at 264.  Connecting the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
test with the Due Process Clause gave defendants two arguments for objecting to 
jurisdiction.  Beyler, supra, at 122.  First, the defendant could default and argue that the 
court lacked jurisdiction, or second, the defendant could attack jurisdiction directly.  Id.  
The Full Faith and Credit analysis relied on state territorial boundaries, and because courts 
connected that analysis with the Due Process Clause analysis, state territorial boundaries 
became relevant after Pennoyer.  Id. 
53 HAZARD & TARUFFA, supra note 33, at 176; Nguyen, supra note 1, at 264 (noting that the 
result was a more efficient law). 
54 Mills, supra note 39, at 922. 
55 See Walter W. Heiser, A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 915, 916 (2000).  Strict territorialism resulted in another problem: courts used 
legal fictions to maneuver around the rigid rules of Pennoyer.  Mills, supra note 39, at 923 
(listing legal fictions including the doctrines of “doing business,” “implied consent,” and 
“presence”).  The Supreme Court addressed these issues in International Shoe Co..  Id. 
56 Mills, supra note 39, at 923.  Interstate travel became more convenient, and jurisdiction 
became a complicated inquiry.  Nguyen, supra note 1, at 264; see also Burnham v. Superior 
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In 1945, the Supreme Court decided International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, which was the Court’s first explicit expansion from the 
Pennoyer doctrine.57  In International Shoe, the Supreme Court found a 
corporation from one state amenable to suit in another state because the 
company transacted business in the other state, employed salesmen 
there, and solicited orders from citizens of the other state.58   
Holding that in order for jurisdiction to comport with the due 
process, the defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum 
state,59 the Court announced the modern test for personal jurisdiction: 
Due process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.60   
Thus, the Supreme Court removed state borders as barriers to the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction and recognized that a flexible 
                                                                                                             
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that in the late nineteenth 
century technological changes and increasing interstate business relaxed the strict limits on 
state jurisdiction over nonresident defendants). 
57 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 316.  Due process requirements apply to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment and to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment.  CASAD & 
RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 528. 
 Requiring minimum contacts before asserting personal jurisdiction protects 
nonresident defendants and state sovereignty.  See Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, 
Ltd., 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 607 
F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Pa. 1984).  Because of the minimum contacts requirement, nonresident 
defendants are protected from litigating in inconvenient forums, where their actions may 
not justify the exercise of jurisdiction, while states are prevented from increasing their 
jurisdiction beyond their legitimate interests.  See Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 481; Allegheny 
Ludlum Steel Corp., 607 F. Supp. at 35. 
60 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).  The United States Supreme Court 
found the contacts were neither “irregular nor casual.”  Id. at 320.  Rather, they were 
“systematic” and “continuous,” resulting in interstate business from which the defendant 
received benefits and protections of the state.  Id.  The suit arose out of those activities.  Id.; 
see also Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).  In Hess, although the Court did not explicitly 
require minimum contacts, it used a minimum contacts analysis to determine a state could 
exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident served with process.  See State-Court Jurisdiction, 
supra note 9, at 205 (noting that in Hess, although the opinions used traditional consent 
theory, they emphasized the state’s interest in litigation). 
Arwood: Personal Jurisdiction:  Are the Federal Rules Keeping Up with (In
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
980 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
“minimum contacts” standard would better suit a mobile society.61  Since 
International Shoe, courts can still assert jurisdiction based on the 
defendant’s physical presence, but his presence is no longer required to 
exercise jurisdiction.62   
The Supreme Court further expanded the personal jurisdiction 
doctrine in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,63 decided in 1957, 
where, for the first time, the Court openly acknowledged a “clearly 
discernable trend toward expanding the permissible scope of state 
jurisdiction.”64  In McGee, the plaintiff sued a Texas company in a 
California court to collect benefits from her son’s life insurance policy.65  
The son’s life insurance policy was the only contact the company had 
with California.66  Still, the Supreme Court upheld the California court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction.67  In its analysis, the Court reasoned that the 
“national economy” resulted in the trend to expand jurisdiction.68  
Likewise, “modern transportation and communication  made it much 
less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he 
engages in economic activity.”69   
While in McGee it became clear that personal jurisdiction may be 
upheld with minimal contacts, Hanson v. Denckla,70 decided in the same 
term, showed that due process cannot be stretched beyond certain 
                                                 
61 Nguyen, supra note 1, at 265; see also Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319 (“[The Due Process] 
clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam 
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or 
relations.”). 
 Traditional jurisdiction analysis insufficiently considered the developing needs of a 
mobile population.  State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 204.  The test operated 
inadequately in the context of exercising jurisdiction over nonresident corporations, 
especially when a nonresident committed a tort in the state but left before service and 
when the nonresident conducted business in the state only through agents.  Id. 
62 Nguyen, supra note 1, at 257; see, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
63 355 U.S. 220 (1957).  The Supreme Court upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction, 
finding that it was sufficient for due process that the suit was based on a contract 
substantially connected to the state.  Id. at 223.  According to the Court, the connection of 
mailing premiums from California, as well as the insured residing in California upon his 
death, gave California a sufficient interest in local litigation.  Id. at 223-24. 
64 Id. at 222. 
65 Id. at 221. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 222 (referring to the national economy as interstate commercial transactions and 
interactions between parties from different regions of the country). 
69 Id. at 223.  The Supreme Court also noted that even a single contract could be a basis 
for jurisdiction because it showed a substantial relationship with the forum.  Id. 
70 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
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limits.71  In Hanson, the Supreme Court held that a state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause for the first time since its 
holding in International Shoe.72  Also, the Court included a new factor, the 
defendant’s purposeful availment, in the minimum contacts 
requirements for a constitutional exercise of jurisdiction:  “[I]t is essential 
in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully 
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”73   
In World-Wide Volkwagen,74 it became clear that absent purposeful 
availment, the minimum contacts test described in International Shoe 
could not be met.75  However, the World-Wide Volkswagen decision 
                                                 
71 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 90. 
72 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254; see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Ideology, Due Process and Civil 
Procedure, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 265, 290 (1993). 
73 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.  Shaffer v. Heitner, decided in 1977, reaffirmed the purposeful 
availment requirement of Hanson.  433 U.S. 186 (1977).  According to Shaffer, exercises of 
quasi in rem jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction must meet the International Shoe 
standard for minimum contacts.  Id. at 212 (“We therefore conclude that all assertions of 
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in 
International Shoe and its progeny.”).  Quasi in rem jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over a 
person based on that person’s interest in property located within the forum’s jurisdiction.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999).  The Shaffer Court indicated that “the 
relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation . . . became the central 
concern” of personal jurisdiction.  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204. 
 In Kulko v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court again found a defendant had not 
purposefully availed himself of the forum, as mandated by Hanson and reaffirmed in 
Shaffer, so the court could not exercise jurisdiction.  436 U.S. 84 (1978).  In Kulko, a California 
resident sought to increase child support payments by her ex-husband, a New York 
resident.  Id. at 87-88.  The father voluntarily sent one of his children to live with ex-wife in 
California.  Id.  Although California’s interest in the welfare of resident minors was 
arguably sufficient to permit the child support action, the Court’s opinion focused on the 
nature of the defendant’s contacts and lack of foreseeability.  Id. passim. 
 The purposeful availment test, as applied in Shaffer, was used again three years later 
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.  444 U.S. 286 (1980).  In World-Wide Volkswagen, 
the Robinsons brought a products liability action in Oklahoma state court as a result of a 
car accident there.  Id. at 288.  The car accident caused a fire that burned Kay Robinson and 
her two children.  Id.  Two of the defendants, Seaway and World-Wide Volkswagen, 
entered special appearances and claimed that Oklahoma’s exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over them would violate due process.  Id. at 288-89.  The Oklahoma trial court rejected that 
argument and held that it could assert jurisdiction over them.  Id. at 289.  Although the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld the assertion of jurisdiction, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed, denying jurisdiction.  Id. at 289-91. 
74 444 U.S. 286. 
75 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.  The United States Supreme Court held that 
the Oklahoma court did not have jurisdiction over the defendants because the unilateral 
activity of a third party did not constitute purposeful availment.  Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson, 
357 U.S. at 253).  Thus, while the plaintiffs claimed that a car could foreseeably cause injury 
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contributed to the fairness inquiry also; it was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court listed reasonableness factors as part of the fairness 
analysis: 
The burden on the defendant . . . will in an appropriate 
case be considered in light of other relevant factors, 
including the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the 
dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient 
and effective relief, at least when that interest is not 
adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose 
the forum; the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; 
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.76 
Even so, the Supreme Court decided World-Wide Volkswagen on the 
purposeful availment prong and held that the Due Process Clause may 
divest a forum of its power to render an enforceable judgment.77  Thus, 
even if litigating in the forum were convenient for the defendant, and 
even if the forum’s interests in applying its law were strong, the court 
could not exercise jurisdiction.78 
                                                                                                             
in Oklahoma, foreseeability alone does not confer jurisdiction under the Due Process 
Clause.  Id.  The Court stated: 
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the 
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.  
Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the 
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled 
into court there. 
Id. at 297 (noting that requiring purposeful availment “gives a degree of predictability to 
the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with 
some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to 
suit”).  Thus, a defendant who is aware he may be sued in a forum can protect himself from 
liability by removing ties with the forum or insuring himself, in order to avoid risk to 
which he does not consent.  Id. 
76 Id. at 292; see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); 
Heiser, supra note 55, at 925 (noting that the Asahi Court gave little guidance as to whether 
or how much weight courts should give to the convenience factors when dealing with a 
United States citizen defendant). 
77 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294; see Andrew Kurvers Spalding, In the Stream of 
the Commerce Clause: Revisiting Asahi in the Wake of Lopez and Morrison, 4 NEV. L.J. 141, 152 
(2003) (asserting that the majority opinion refused to allow “convenience” and 
“reasonableness” to override consent); see also Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 
1985) (noting that fairness factors cannot confer jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
where minimum contacts analysis weighs against the exercise of jurisdiction). 
78 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294; Spalding, supra note 77, at 152; see Stuart, 772 
F.2d  at 1185. 
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Justice Brennan dissented in World-Wide Volkswagen, asserting that 
jurisdiction should be based on the state’s interests instead of the 
defendant’s volitional conduct.79  He quoted McGee for the notion of 
expanding jurisdiction and noted that “the nationalization of commerce 
and ease of transportation and communication has accelerated . . . since 
1957, when McGee was decided.”80  Although he concurred in the finding 
of purposeful availment, he favored a proportionality test in which the 
reasonableness factors could displace the defendant’s contacts and vice-
versa.81   
                                                 
79 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
emphasis on the defendant’s contacts does not properly weigh other reasonableness factors 
such as the forum State’s interests and the degree of inconvenience suffered by a 
defendant).  His view would not completely remove the purposefulness requirement.  Id. at 
300.  Instead, he would look to “actual inconvenience” rather than “theoretical 
inconvenience” of the defendant.  Spalding, supra note 77, at 153. 
80 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  According to 
Justice Brennan’s analysis, the automobile dealer could foresee and intended to place a 
vehicle into the stream of commerce that could travel to distant states.  Id. at 306; 
Vandevelde, supra note 72, at 302 (noting that all of the dissenters from World-Wide 
Volkswagen opposed the majority’s limit on the expansion of personal jurisdiction).  Justice 
Brennan observed that technological advancements, which previously had resulted in 
expanded jurisdiction, had increased.  Vandevelde, supra note 72, at 302.  Further, the 
dissenters disagreed with the majority’s attempt to create a mechanical test for minimum 
contacts.  See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that 
International Shoe itself had “specifically declined to establish a mechanical test based on the 
quantum of contacts between a State and the defendant”). 
81 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  For Justice Brennan, a 
defendant’s participation in the stream of commerce satisfies purposeful availment.  Id.  
Under this analysis, a defendant could reasonably expect to be sued in a forum where his 
product causes injury.  Id.  A majority of the Court believed the International Shoe minimum 
contacts test could only be met if the defendant had availed himself of the forum state.  Id.  
However, each of the three Supreme Court cases that had considered purposeful availment 
had not found sufficient purposeful availment to confer jurisdiction.  See, e.g., World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235 (1958).  Thus, since purposeful availment had not been found, it was questionable 
if purposeful availment could support jurisdiction.  Vandevelde, supra note 72 , at 303. 
 The Supreme Court decided three cases in the time between World-Wide Volkswagen 
and Burger King.  For example, see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc. in which the Court held 
that selling ten to fifteen thousand magazines per month was sufficient to base jurisdiction 
over the out-of-state corporation.  465 U.S 770, 772-73 (1984).  Justice Rehnquist questioned 
the fairness of bringing the defendant into the forum and inquired into the forum’s interest 
in adjudicating the claim.  Id. at 775-78.  Next, he observed that the defendant had 
continuous and systematic contacts with the state market.  Id. at 781.  Thus, the state had 
jurisdiction.  Id. 
 The Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones held that California had jurisdiction over a 
reporter and editor of the National Enquirer in a libel action.  465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984).  
The article was written based on California sources and caused harm in California, where 
the plaintiff lived.  Id.  Jurisdiction was proper because of the effects in California from the 
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In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,82 
which clarified the necessity of purposeful availment and its relevance to 
minimum contacts factors discussed in earlier cases.83  The Court 
explained that once purposeful contact was found, contacts should be 
weighed with other factors to determine whether jurisdiction comported 
with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”84  
Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that “it is an inescapable fact 
of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is 
                                                                                                             
defendant’s out of state conduct.  Id. at 789.  The Court recognized that the defendant’s 
tortious actions were aimed at California where the defendant participated “in an alleged 
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident.”  Id. at 790. 
 In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, the Court decided that no jurisdiction 
existed over a Colombian corporation in a wrongful death action.  466 U.S. 408, 418-19 
(1984).  All of the parties agreed that the wrongful death claims did not “arise out of” and 
were unrelated to the defendant’s activities in the forum.  Id. at 415.  The plaintiffs in 
Helicopteros asserted general personal jurisdiction over the defendants, but they were 
unsuccessful because the Court found that general jurisdiction could only be asserted when 
contacts are continuous and systematic.  Id. at 416-17 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. 
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)).  Thus, regular and substantial purchasing activity does 
not support general jurisdiction.  Id. at 416-19.  Justice Brennan dissented, noting that 
specific in personam jurisdiction existed when general in personam jurisdiction did not.  Id. 
at 419 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
82 471 U.S. 462 (1985).  In Burger King, the defendants were two Michigan residents who 
had a franchise of the Burger King Corporation in Michigan.  Id. at 466-67.  The Michigan 
defendants had applied for a Burger King franchise at the Michigan office and had mainly 
worked with that office.  Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 466-67.  However, they had 
contacted Burger King’s headquarters in Florida, and the franchise contract had provided 
for Florida law.  Id. at 465-66 (noting that the franchise agreement contained a Florida 
choice of law clause and required that monthly payments be made to Florida).  Burger King 
sued in Florida federal district court when the defendants fell behind in their payments.  Id. 
at 468.  The Burger King Court held that the Florida courts had jurisdiction over the 
Michigan defendants.  Id. at 487.  Burger King was the first United States Supreme Court 
case since McGee involving personal jurisdiction in the context of a contracts question.  
Compare id., with Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 466 U.S. at 418-19, Calder, 465 U.S. at 
188-89, Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781, World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294, and Hanson, 357 U.S. 
at 253. 
83 Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 487; see Vandevelde, supra note 72 , at 304.  Justice 
Brennan wrote the opinion and set out a two step process for analyzing personal 
jurisdiction questions.  Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472-74.  First, the defendant must have 
“‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum.”  Id. at 472.  Thus, the 
unilateral activity of a person other than the defendant could not satisfy the requirement of 
the defendant’s purposeful contact with the forum.  Id. at 474.  However, the requirement 
of purposeful availment could be met by placing a product in the stream of commerce with 
the expectation that it would reach consumers in the forum.  Id. at 476. 
84 Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477.  The fairness factors used by the Court were those 
listed in World-Wide Volkswagen.  Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).  The 
factors were discussed in Burger King, and the factors were applied in Asahi.  Id.; see Asahi 
Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, 
thus obviating the need for physical presence.”85 
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior 
Court.86  In Asahi, although the Justices disagreed on the purposeful 
availment issue, the Court agreed on the fairness concerns.87  The 
Supreme Court looked to the factors from World-Wide Volkswagen and 
Burger King in deciding that litigation between a Japanese defendant and 
a Taiwanese plaintiff in California was too unfair.88  Even so, Justice 
                                                 
85 Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476; see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 
(1992). 
86 480 U.S. 102 .  In Asahi, a California resident sued Cheng Shin Rubber Company for 
injuries that occurred as a result of a tire blow-out on his motorcycle.  Id. at 105-06.  The 
parties settled, leaving only the indemnity action between the manufacturer of the inner-
tube, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company, a Taiwanese company, and the 
manufacturer of the tube’s valve, Asahi Metal Industry Company, a Japanese company.  Id. 
at 106.  The sales between Cheng Shin and Asahi occurred in Taiwan.  Id.  Although a 
substantial number of tires with Asahi valves were sold in California, Asahi had not itself 
sold the valves in California.  Id. 
 Asahi was never named by the plaintiff in the case; Asahi was only brought into the 
suit by Cheng Shin in an indemnity action.  See id. at 106.  In Part II-B, the Court found that 
California’s exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi would violate due process because it would 
be too unfair to force two foreign companies to litigate in a foreign court.  Id. at 113-16.  The 
court emphasized the burden on Asahi, California’s lack of interest, and the 
unreasonableness of asserting jurisdiction in such a case.  Id.  However, the Court was 
dramatically split over the question of if Asahi had purposefully availed itself of the forum.  
Id. at 116-17. 
87 Id. at 113-16.  Justice O’Connor used a stream of commerce plus analysis, noting that 
additional conduct is needed beyond the defendant placing a product in the stream of 
commerce.  Id. at 112-13 (O’Connor, J., plurality).  Some factors that may constitute the 
necessary additional conduct include designing the product for the forum state, providing 
advice to customers in the state, marketing through a distributor in the state, or advertising 
in the state.  Id.  In applying these factors to the case, Justice O’Connor found insufficient 
contacts to exercise jurisdiction.  Id. 
 Therefore, under Justice O’Connor’s analysis, mere awareness that a product would 
injure a California plaintiff because it was placed in the stream of commerce is insufficient 
to establish purposeful availment of the laws and protections of California.  Id.  But see 
generally Beyler, supra note 52 (suggesting that because personal jurisdiction can affect 
applicable law, treating advertising as a basis for personal jurisdiction can undermine First 
Amendment rights). 
 In contrast, according to Justice Brennan’s opinion, placing the product in the stream 
of commerce with the awareness that it may enter the forum state would render a 
defendant liable there.  Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  (“[T]he stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or 
eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to 
distribution to retail sale.”).  Therefore, according to Justice Brennan’s view, as long as “a 
participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum 
State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”  Id. 
88 Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); Heiser, supra note 55, at 925-27 (noting that because Asahi involves two noncitizen 
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Brennan’s concurrence referred to the recent changes in technology, such 
as mobile phones and computers, and how these changes should affect 
jurisdiction.89   
B. Past Effects of Technology on Jurisdiction:  Changing Gears with the 
Federal Rules 
Changes that have influenced the Supreme Court in expanding 
jurisdiction have also impacted decisions of the Advisory Committee in 
proposing amendments to Rule 4.  In order for a federal court to assert 
jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must either consent or be 
served with process pursuant to Rule 4.90  However, a defendant who is 
                                                                                                             
defendants, the Supreme Court gave little guidance as to whether or how much weight 
should be given to the convenience factors when dealing with a United States citizen 
defendant). 
89 Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  Since Asahi, the Court decided Burnham v. Superior Court in which the Court upheld 
the authority of a state to assert jurisdiction over a transient defendant based only on 
territorial power.  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990); see also Grace v. 
MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (upholding jurisdiction under the transient 
rule over a person flying over Arkansas in an airplane because the person was within the 
territorial limits of Arkansas and was therefore subject to service under the federal rules). 
In Burnham, Dennis Burnham visited southern California on business, and, during the same 
trip, he visited his children in San Francisco.  495 U.S. at 608.  While he was in San 
Francisco, he was served with a summons in a divorce action brought by his wife who 
resided there.  Id.  The issue decided by the Court was “whether the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment denies . . . jurisdiction over a nonresident, who was personally 
served with process while temporarily in that State, in a suit unrelated to his activities in 
the State.”  Id. at 607.  The Court upheld the state’s authority to assert jurisdiction.  Id. at 
620-21 (Scalia, J., plurality).  The defendant voluntarily present in a forum has clear notice 
that he is subject to suit in the forum.  Id. at 624. 
 The effect of the Burnham decision is that the defendant’s physical presence within the 
borders of a state at the time of service is alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction.  See id. at 
613 (Scalia, J., plurality).  The Court still uses raw territorial power to confer jurisdiction 
over a transient defendant.  See id. (Scalia, J., plurality).  But see id. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (holding that Shaffer requires applying the 
minimum contacts test while finding that presence itself satisfies the test and confers 
jurisdiction).  Regarding fairness in asserting jurisdiction based on presence, Justice 
Brennan argued that three elements reduce the likelihood of unfair and burdensome 
results.  Id. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  One of the 
elements, technology, in the form of modern communication and transportation, decreases 
the costs of defending a suit in a foreign forum.  Id. at 638-39.  Likewise, discovery by mail 
and telephone can decrease the burden.  Id.  Moreover, the defendant had already traveled 
to the forum at least one time—the time when he was served with process—so returning to 
the state is likely not “prohibitively inconvenient.”  Id. at 639-40. 
90 See CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 223 (noting that “the physical connection 
between the defendant and the process server . . . gives the defendant notice . . . [and] 
symbolizes the court’s physical power over the defendant”); Simard, supra note 9, at 1645 
(noting that courts assert personal jurisdiction over defendants through service of process); 
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amenable to service is not always subject to personal jurisdiction.91  
Further, while jurisdiction must comport with due process requirements, 
as explained in Supreme Court jurisprudence,92 Congress may expand 
the federal courts’ authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
defendants.93  Accordingly, some federal statutes provide for nationwide 
service of process, thereby increasing the federal courts’ jurisdictional 
reach.94    
Congress grants the Supreme Court the power to promulgate the 
Rules, and the Supreme Court looks to committees to draft and revise 
the Rules.95  The process for creating the Rules is found in the Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934.96  The Rules were first adopted on September 16, 
1938.97   
                                                                                                             
see FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1312 n.61 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); see also Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103 (1987). 
91 Omni Capital Int’l, 484 U.S. at 103; CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 222 (noting that 
constitutional limitations such as minimum contacts are separate from service). 
92 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 222; see supra Part II.A (discussing United States 
Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases). 
93 Frasch, supra note 26, at 698; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells 
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977); CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, § 5-1. 
94 HAZARD & TARUFFA, supra note 33, at 177; Erichson, supra note 39, at 1122-25.  Rule 4 
permits a federal court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who would be subject to 
jurisdiction in state court, under the one hundred mile bulge rule, in interpleader cases, 
and pursuant to specific federal statutes.  CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 552-56. 
95 Frasch, supra note 26, at 699. The current process of federal rule-making began in 1958.  
Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
323, 324 (1991); see also RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE, 6 (West 3d ed. 1998) (referring to 
procedural reforms of 1938 leading to this process).  Now, federal rule-makers are the 
members of the Judicial Conference’s Standing Committee on Rules and the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules.  Baker, supra, at 329; see Erichson, supra note 39, at 1117 n.4.  The 
Judicial Conference includes the Chief Justice and other federal judges.  Erichson, supra 
note 39, at 1117 n.4.  This Conference has a standing committee, and the standing 
committee has an advisory committee on the Rules.  Id.  Therefore, although the rules are 
officially prescribed by the Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference drafts the rules.  Id. 
 The Advisory Committee Reporter, usually a law professor, drafts new rules or 
amendments.  Id.  Then, the Advisory Committee revises the rule.  Id.  Next, the Standing 
Committee reviews the rule, which then goes for public consideration, another revision, 
and finally Supreme Court approval.  Id.  The Rules are presented to Congress for review 
and approval prior to becoming effective.  Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (“[S]uch rules shall 
not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice.”). 
96 See Erichson, supra note 39, at 1117 n.4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (providing that 
the judicial rulemaking may affect practice and procedure, but it may not enlarge, modify, 
or abridge substantive rights).  The Permanent Process Act of 1792 first allowed the 
Supreme Court to make rules for federal courts.  Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 351, 353 (1987).  However, the Conformity Act of 1872 removed the Court’s rule-
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A main objective of the Rules is to allow federal courts to determine 
entire controversies.98  The procedures established by the Rules 
demonstrate this objective by allowing parties to plead multiple theories, 
amend complaints, and join claims arising out the same transaction as 
the original claim.99  This objective has also influenced amendments to 
the Rules, such as adding the “bulge rule” to Rule 4, which provides for 
service to confer jurisdiction over joined parties within one hundred 
miles of the courthouse from which the summons issues.100  The 
                                                                                                             
making authority.  Baker, supra note 95, at 324.  As a result, the federal courts lacked 
uniformity in pleading or procedure.  Id. at 354.  In 1912, Thomas W. Shelton, head of the 
ABA’s Uniform Judicial Procedure Committee, worked to reform federal civil procedure by 
giving the rule-making authority to the Supreme Court.  Goodman, supra, at 354.  The Law 
and Equity Act of 1915 partially reformed equity courts through modern procedures and a 
code system.  Id.  Then, in 1934, Congress passed the Enabling Act with President 
Roosevelt’s support; this Act authorizes the Supreme Court to make general rules and 
allowed the Court to create one procedure for equity and law.  Id. at 355. 
97 See Hon. Charles E. Clark, Experience Under the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 8 F.R.D. 497 (1949).  The federal rules were adopted in two stages.  Goodman, 
supra note 96 , at 353.  First, the supporters obtained legislative authority for the Supreme 
Court to create rules for the district courts.  Id.  Then, the bar needed to agree to the nature 
of the proposed rules before taking the rules to Congress.  Id. 
 The new rules proposed a uniform federal system for all federal courts.  Id. at 359.  
Rule 2 created a civil action and abolished the distinction between law and equity.  Id.  The 
rules included provisions for joining claims and parties, and they provided for discovery.  
Id. 
98 Simard, supra note 9, at 1647; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the rules “shall be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action”).  The word “action” has been construed to mean “entire controversy” 
instead of claim or cause of action.  Simard, supra note 9, at 1647. 
99 Simard, supra note 9, at 1647; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1; FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (allowing a party 
to plead multiple theories arising out of the same operative facts); FED. R. CIV. P. 15 
(allowing a party to amend a complaint to include an omitted count with permission of the 
court).  Also, the joinder rules allow courts to resolve entire controversies by requiring 
parties to bring against opposing parties any claims, counter-claims, or cross-claims arising 
out of the same transaction.  Simard, supra note 9, at 1647.  Further, other federal civil 
procedure practices outside the rule operate towards this objective.  Id. at 1649-50.  For 
example, supplemental jurisdiction encourages parties to consolidate their related claims 
by allowing courts to exercise jurisdiction over those claims that would otherwise be 
jurisdictionally insufficient.  Id.  Res judicata also requires litigants to bring all of their 
related claims in one suit.  Id. 
100 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) (1963), advisory committee notes; 
Quinones v. Pa. Gen. Ins., 804 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1986); Coleman v. Am. Exp. Isbradtsen 
Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that the third party only needs to have 
minimum contacts with the state in which the bulge service is made).  The bulge rule 
applies regardless of whether the jurisdiction is federal question, diversity, or admiralty.  
The bulge rule applies to parties that have been joined to a lawsuit to allow courts to fully 
decide matters before them.  See Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(noting that the correct method for measuring the one hundred mile distance within which 
the district court process may be served is by a straight line or “as the crow flies” measure 
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Advisory Committee notes for the 1963 Amendments, which established 
this rule, emphasized that the policy of the rule was “to promote the 
objective of enabling the court to determine entire controversies.”101   
In the 1960s, the Advisory Committee found that then-modern 
transportation and ease of communication decreased the potential 
burden suffered by a defendant forced to litigate in more distant 
forums.102  Because courts were more easily accessible, allowing service 
within a one hundred mile radius of the courthouse would not offend 
due process for the defendant.103  Thus, according to the Committee, 
“[i]n the light of present-day facilities for communication and travel, the 
territorial range of the service allowed, analogous to that which applies 
to the service of a subpoena . . . can hardly work hardship on the parties 
summoned.”104  
                                                                                                             
of air miles, which constitutes a uniform standard and offers more certainty than 
measuring based on road miles).  CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 554. 
101 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B), advisory committee notes. 
102 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) (1963), advisory committee notes; see also Aaron R. Chacker, 
Note, E-ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v. Rio International Interlink, 48 VILL. L. REV. 597, 
600 (2003) (noting that Rule 4 lists available methods of service, and defining service of 
process as the formal method of giving notice). 
103 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) (1963), advisory committee notes.  Technology has changed 
since the Mullane “reasonably calculated” standard was first set out by the Court, and in 
1980, the first post-Mullane authorization of notice through a novel communication 
technology was approved by a district court.  Chacker, supra note 102, at 605.  The court 
there allowed service by telex partly because telex was a reasonable method of 
communication to which most defendants had access, stating: 
Courts . . . cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology.  No 
longer do we live in a world where communications are conducted 
solely by mail carried by fast sailing clipper or steam ships.  Electronic 
communication via satellite can and does provide instantaneous 
transmission of notice and information.  No longer must process be 
mailed to a defendant’s door when he can receive complete notice at 
an electronic terminal inside his very office, even when the door is 
steel and bolted shut. 
Id. at 606 (quoting New England Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and 
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).  Courts have also approved of service 
of process by facsimile.  Id. at 608.  Also recently, television notice was approved by a court 
for service on Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda.  Id. at 611.  Because the location of the 
defendants was unknown, only this “unusual method of notification” would likely notify 
the defendants of the litigation.  Id.  Courts have also recently considered service of process 
via electronic mail.  Id. 
104 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) (1963) advisory committee notes.  Service of a subpoena follows 
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(e)(1).  Id. 
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The Advisory Committee considered amending Rule 4 again in 1989, 
to allow for nationwide service of process in all federal question cases.105  
The proposed rule provided:  
Unless a statute of the United States otherwise provides, 
or the Constitution in a specific application otherwise 
requires, service of a summons or filing of a waiver of 
service is also effective to establish jurisdiction over the 
person of any defendant against whom is asserted a 
claim arising under federal law.106 
Had the rule passed, it would have effectively allowed federal courts 
to assert jurisdiction over defendants in federal question cases based on 
aggregate minimum contacts with the United States rather than on the 
contacts with the state in which the federal district court was located.107 
Since 1938, when the Rules were adopted, to 1963, when the bulge 
rule was passed, technology had changed enormously.108  In 1938, there 
were no typewriters, no direct dialing long distance phone calls, and no 
passenger jets.109  By 1963, technology had advanced so dramatically that 
the Rules were amended to account for the changes.110  Technology has 
again dramatically changed in the more than forty years since the bulge 
rule amendment.111  Today, attorneys regularly rely on electronic mail, 
Internet based legal research services, and computers with word 
                                                 
105 Erichson, supra note 39, at 1127 (providing the text of the proposed amendment).  An 
earlier draft of the proposed rule had recommended making the proposal contingent on 
Congress amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to include the same provision, thus making 
Congress’s consent to the change explicit.  Id. at 1129 n.82. 
106 See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 127 F.R.D.  237, 280-81 (1989); 
Erichson, supra note 39, at 1127.  Under a rule that gives a federal court personal 
jurisdiction from a nationwide service of process provision, the minimum contacts test 
would become whether there were minimum aggregate contacts with the entire nation 
instead of with the state in which the district court is located.  Erichson, supra note 39, at 
1123 n.30. 
 The proposed rule included three ideas and would have dramatically changed 1989 
Rule 4(e) and (f).  Id. at 1127 n.65.  The proposed rule left unchanged the bulge rule for 
joinder.  Id. at 1127.  Also, in diversity actions, it connected federal jurisdiction to state-
court jurisdiction by only allowing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction when a state-court 
could do so.  Id.  Finally, it provided for nationwide service in federal question cases.  Id. 
107 Erichson, supra note 39, at 1123 n.30, 1127. 
108 MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 95, at 6. 
109 Id. 
110 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) (1963), advisory committee notes. 
111 See BRINKLEY, supra note 2, at 931. 
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processing programs in conducting their day-to-day activities.112  These 
technological advancements which enhance attorneys’ abilities to 
manage their workload are also used by the federal courts.113   
C. Current Technology and the Federal Courts:  The Vehicle of the Future 
Since Asahi and the 1963 amendments to Rule 4, technology has 
rapidly advanced and is now used throughout society.114  The 
development of the Internet allows many Americans access to 
businesses, resources, and each other from home and work.115  For 
example, electronic access to court information is available to the public 
through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) 
system.116  Further, the PACER system has recently been enhanced by 
                                                 
112 MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 95, at 6. 
113 See infra Part II.C. 
114 Cf. supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing changes between 1963 and 
the Asahi decision and since Asahi was decided and today).  While in 1984, there were less 
than one thousand computers connected to the Internet, by 1994, there were over six 
million computers connected.  See BRINKLEY, supra note 2, at 931.  In 2001, approximately 
four hundred million people world-wide and one hundred thirty million Americans were 
using the Internet.  Id.; see Matthew Oetker, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 47 
DRAKE L. REV. 613, 614 (1999); Richard Philip Rollo, Casenote: The Morass of Internet Personal 
Jurisdiction: It Is Time for a Paradigm Shift,  51 FLA. L. REV. 667, 676 (1999).  The Internet is a 
network of computers that developed from a Department of Defense project called the 
Advanced Research Project Administration, which allowed researchers direct access to 
laboratory computers and assisted with transmitting communications.  Rollo, supra, at 676.  
Thus, the Internet is a series of linked and overlapping networks that use the same data 
transfer protocol.  Id.  Transfer of information happens almost instantly, and the Internet 
can be used to communicate with the world.  Id.; Eric C. Newburger, Current Population 
Reports: Home Computers and Internet Use in the United States: August 2000, United States 
Census Bureau (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p23-207.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2004). 
115 See Newburger, supra note 114.  Fifty-four million households, about fifty-one percent 
of homes, had a computer in August 2000.  Id.  (noting that this is an increase from forty-
two percent of homes having a computer in the December 1988 study).  Further, in 
households that have computers, Internet usage is so common that computer availability 
and  Internet use are practically the same.  Id.  Ninety-four million people use the Internet 
at home, and more than two in five homes have Internet access.  Id.  Since 1984, the first 
year the Census Bureau collected information on computer usage, the country has 
experienced a five-fold increase in the number of households with computers.  Id.  In 1997, 
less than half of all households with computers had a member of the household who was 
using the Internet.  Id.  In 2000, more than four out of five households with a computer had 
at least one member using the Internet at home.  Id. 
116 Id.  PACER, an electronic service, provides public access to case and docket 
information from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts.  Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records, available at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2004) (noting that PACER logins are available on the website).  User fees fund the 
electronic access.  Id.  The federal judiciary set the fee at a rate of seven cents per page with 
a maximum cost of $2.10 per document.  Id. 
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the Case Management and Electronic Files System (“CM/ECF”) which 
also utilizes the Internet.117  Through the CM/ECF program, federal 
courts maintain case documents in electronic form.118  Further, each court 
may permit online filing of case documents such as pleadings, motions, 
and petitions.119   
In all federal courts, the projected implementation date for the 
CM/ECF program is May 2005.120  However, many courts already use 
                                                 
117 See Maria Perez Crist, The E-Brief: Legal Writing for an Online World, 33 N.M. L. REV. 49, 
54 (2003) (noting that as electronic filing alters courts’ procedures, the use of electronic 
submissions will dominate); Case Management and Electronic Case Files, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecf.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).  One judge noted 
that this program may “significant[ly] change in the way federal courts do their work since 
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.”  Crist, supra, at 51. 
 The CM/ECF system uses standard computer hardware, an Internet connection, and a 
browser, and it accepts documents in Portable Document Format (“PDF”).  Case 
Management and Electronic Case Files, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/ 
cmecf.html (last visited February 2, 2004).  The CM/ECF system is designed to accept only 
PDF documents because that format allows a document to keep its formatting, fonts, and 
pagination, regardless of what kind of computer is used to view the document.  Id.  Adobe 
created the software and has also developed a way to convert most documents created in 
word processing programs into PDF.  Id.  Each user has a court-issued password, and after 
logging on to the court’s website, the filer enters information about the case and document 
and attaches the document.  Id. 
118 Case Management and Electronic Case Files, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
cmecf/cmecf.html (last visited February 2, 2004).  CM/ECF gives the courts enhanced 
docket management, as well.  Id.  With the program, courts can make their documents 
available to the public over the Internet.  Id.  While the  Internet raises privacy concerns, the 
Judicial Conference has adopted recommendations to address these issues.  Id. 
119 Id.  Federal courts have also recently approved service by electronic mail under Rule 
4.  Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve Got Mail:  The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service 
of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337 (2003) (noting a modern trend towards universal electronic 
service); see also Heather A. Sapp, You’ve Been Served! Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio 
International Interlink, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 493 (2003) (noting that while the Rules do not 
explicitly authorize service by electronic mail, it is permitted so long as it meets the 
requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are You Being 
Served?: E-Mail and (Due) Service of Process, 51 S.C. L. REV. 227 (2000) (discussing the 
feasibility of electronic mail to notify defendants of actions filed against them in federal 
courts). 
120 Case Management and Electronic Case Files, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
cmecf/cmecf.html (last visited February 2, 2004).  Bankruptcy courts began implementation 
in 2001.  Id.  District courts began in 2002, while appellate courts should begin in late 2004.  
Id.; see Colby, supra note  119, at 337 (noting that a modern trend allows service of process 
by electronic mail to foreign defendants that may be difficult to reach outside of the United 
States by traditional means, and arguing for amending FED. R. CIV. P. 4 to include electronic 
service within the United States); see also Chacker, supra note  102, at 598 (noting that 
changes in technology, such as facsimile and telex, have given courts extended reach so 
that previously unattainable parties are now unable to avoid submission to a court’s 
jurisdiction). 
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the system and accept electronic filings.121  In these courts, attorneys file 
documents over the Internet.122  Further, although regular document 
filing fees apply, internet filing does not include any additional fees.123   
While all courts will have electronic filing capabilities in 2005, courts 
are not required to use electronic filing.124  The use of electronic filing is a 
district by district determination.125  Thus, district courts allow electronic 
filing by passing a local rule pursuant to Rule 5(e).126  Further, in 
November 2004, the Advisory Committee proposed an amendment to 
                                                 
121 Case Management and Electronic Case Files, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
cmecf/cmecf.html (last visited February 2, 2004).  There are currently thirty-three district 
courts, sixty-eight bankruptcy courts, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of 
Federal Claims that are using the CM/ECF system.  Id.  Over ten million cases are on 
CM/ECF systems and more that fifty thousand lawyers have filed documents over the 
Internet.  Id.  Each court goes through a ten month process to implement the system, and 
each month four or five courts have completed the implementation.  Id.  As of January 
2005, the following federal courts were currently operational on the system: Alabama 
Middle; Alabama Northern; Alabama Southern; California Central; California Eastern; 
California Northern; Colorado, Connecticut; District of Columbia; Florida Middle; Florida 
Northern; Georgia Middle; Georgia Northern; Idaho; Illinois Central; Illinois Southern; 
Indiana Southern; Indiana Northern; Iowa Southern; Kansas; Kentucky Eastern; Kentucky 
Western; Louisiana Western; Maryland; Maine; Massachusetts; Michigan Eastern; Michigan 
Western; Minnesota; Mississippi Northern; Mississippi Southern; Missouri Eastern; 
Missouri Western; Nebraska; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New York Eastern; New York 
Northern; New York Southern; New York Western; Ohio Northern; Ohio Southern; 
Oklahoma Northern; Oklahoma Western; Oregon; Pennsylvania Eastern; Pennsylvania 
Middle; Puerto Rico; South Dakota; Tennessee Eastern; Tennessee Western; Texas Eastern; 
Texas Northern; Texas Southern; Vermont; Virginia Western; Washington Eastern; 
Washington Western; West Virginia Southern; Wisconsin Eastern; Wyoming; Court of 
International Trade; Court of Federal Claims.  Id.  However, of those courts, the following 
courts did not accept electronic filing: Alabama Northern; Colorado; Iowa Southern; 
Michigan Eastern; Oklahoma Northern; Tennessee Western; Vermont; West Virginia 
Southern; Wyoming.  As of January 2005, the following federal district courts were in the 
process of implementing the system: Alaska; Arkansas Eastern; Arkansas Western; 
Arizona; California Southern; Delaware; Florida Southern; Georgia Southern; Guam; 
Hawaii; Illinois Northern; Louisiana Eastern; Louisiana Middle; Montana; Nevada; North 
Carolina Eastern; North Carolina Middle; North Carolina Western; North Dakota; 
Northern Mariana Islands; Oklahoma Eastern; Pennsylvania Western; Rhode Island; South 
Carolina; Tennessee Middle; Texas Western; Utah; Virginia Eastern; West Virginia 
Northern.  Id. 
122 Id.  Further, after filing, parties to the litigation receive immediate electronic mail 
confirmation in the form of a “Notice of Electronic Filing.”  Id.  This automatically 
generated notice indicates the court’s receipt of the filing.  Id.  Also, other parties 
automatically receive electronic mail notification of the filing.  Id. 
123 Id.  Parties receive one free copy of documents filed electronically in their cases, and it 
can either be saved or printed for their files.  Id.  Additional copies are available at $.07 per 
page with a maximum fee of $2.10 per document.  Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e). 
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Rule 5, which would allow district courts to require electronic filing of 
documents.127  The Committee note specifically refers to the advantages 
to courts and litigants from electronic filing.128  Additionally, the 
Committee clearly recognized that all parties may not be able to use 
electronic filing easily, and the notes suggest that district courts exclude 
these parties from the requirement for good cause.129   
III.  ANALYSIS:  THE FEDERAL RULES SHOULD KEEP UP WITH (INTERNET) 
TRAFFIC 
Personal jurisdiction rules in federal court are antiquated in light of 
modern technology because they still follow traditional state boundaries 
as a proxy for fairness.130  Therefore, technology that connects people 
across these traditional boundaries strains the current personal 
jurisdiction analysis.131  As a result, methods courts use to address 
developing technology are inconsistent because courts are obligated to 
apply the International Shoe approach to resolve a problem unanticipated 
by the International Shoe Court.132  Similarly, technological progress has 
resulted in jurisdictional issues not considered by those who designed 
the current FRCP, and the FRCP should be reformed to embrace this 
progress.133  Thus, jurisdictional problems created by new technology 
can be answered through using that same technology to reform the 
law.134   
Fairness and sovereignty have traditionally been guiding principles 
in the development of jurisdictional analysis.135  Part IV.A of this Note 
discusses the meaning of fairness and argues that the fairness inquiry is 
ineffective because territorial boundaries are no longer relevant to the 
                                                 
127 FED. R. CIV. P. 5 (Nov. 2004) (preliminary draft). 
128 Id. advisory committee notes.  Most courts with this technology use electronic filing 
because it reduces judicial expenditures.  Case Management and Electronic Case Files, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecf.html (last visited February 2, 2004). 
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 5, advisory committee notes (Nov. 2004) (preliminary draft). 
130 See supra notes 91-114.  Use of the Internet has rapidly increased.  See Newburger, 
supra note 114.  The Internet is now accessible from school, work, public libraries, and 
homes.  Id.; see Nguyen, supra note 1, at 266-67; Oetker, supra note 114, at 614 (noting that in 
1981, only a few hundred computers used the Internet, but by 1997, over fifteen thousand 
host computers and thirty million users existed). 
131 Conley, supra note 13, at 407; Taylor, supra note 10, at 1163-64; see CASAD & RICHMAN, 
supra note 5, at 178. 
132 Conley, supra note 13, at 407 (suggesting that now is the time to alter the jurisdictional 
inquiry). 
133 Id.; supra notes 90-114. 
134 Cf. Conley, supra note 13, at 407. 
135 See Nguyen, supra note 1, at 273-74. 
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issue of fairness.136  Then, Part IV.B analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
previous expansion of jurisdiction in response to changing technology 
and suggests that since the last case decided by the Supreme Court was 
both factually distinguishable from most cases and dated before the 
widespread use of the  Internet, the fairness inquiry is outdated.137  
Finally, Part IV.C argues that it is time to expand jurisdiction again, 
based on the history of expanding Rule 4, to accommodate technological 
advancements.138   
A. Irrelevance of Territorial Boundaries to Fairness Concerns 
While the fairness inquiry has become basic to personal jurisdiction 
analysis, the inquiry has not been stagnant.139  Instead, the idea of 
fairness has evolved over time, responding to social, economic, and 
technological changes.140  In the inquiry, fairness often refers to either 
convenience or sovereignty.141  Thus, while the term can focus on 
convenience issues, jurisdictional fairness also refers to how much power 
the sovereign entity has.142  Because a court can assert jurisdiction when 
a defendant subjects himself to the forum,143 if territorial boundaries are 
used as proxy for fairness, the relevant boundaries for asserting 
jurisdiction should be those of the “sovereign who has created the 
court.”144  Therefore, because the sovereign power of the United States 
covers a larger geographical territory than that of any one state, federal 
service of process could be fully effective without regard to state 
boundaries.145   
                                                 
136 See infra Part III.A. 
137 See infra Part III.B. 
138 See infra Part III.C. 
139 Erichson, supra note 39, at 1140; see Casad, supra note 9, at 1599-1606. 
140 Nguyen, supra note 1, at 273; see supra Part II.A (discussing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding the changing personal jurisdiction analysis). 
141 Erichson, supra note 39, at 1142; Nguyen, supra note 1, at 274; see also World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). 
142 Erichson, supra note 39, at 1142.  Article III of the United States Constitution allows 
Congress to establish federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court as necessary.  Id. at 1141.  
Therefore, Congress could have chosen to establish only one nationwide federal district.  Id.  
Jurisdiction could have then been asserted throughout the district (or across the country).  
Id.  Federal districts did not have to be limited by state boundaries.  Id. 
143 Id. at 1142-43. 
144 Id. at 1143 n.171; see also Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 572, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) (noting that Congress may 
extend the territorial jurisdiction of a federal court to any part of the United States).  A state 
court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction is irrelevant.  Erichson, supra note 39, at 1143 n.171. 
145 See Erichson, supra note 39, at 1143 n.171, 1144; see also FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 
F.2d 251, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1981).  Fairness and sovereignty are both elements of the 
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Personal jurisdiction has used state or district lines as a proxy for 
convenience since Pennoyer v. Neff.146  Then, the sovereign-created 
boundaries were state lines largely because of society’s inability to 
travel.147  With the creation of the Rules, the federal service provisions 
also followed state boundaries, at least partially, because of the 
immobility of society at the time.148  However, state lines do not 
accurately measure the time or expense of travel.149  These boundaries 
were always inadequate as a proxy for fairness because they ignored that 
one defendant possibly suffered no inconvenience by crossing a nearby 
state line, while another could have suffered substantial inconvenience 
by crossing a large state but remaining within the territorial borders of 
the forum.150  Indeed, International Shoe demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court recognized the ineffectiveness of state boundaries as a proxy for 
fairness because it allowed courts to reach beyond the borders of their 
forum states when minimum contacts were shown.151   
While society was more mobile in the 1940s than during the time of 
Pennoyer, it was still far less technologically advanced than society is 
                                                                                                             
Fourteenth Amendment state-court jurisdiction test, but they do not apply equivalently to 
the federal courts.  See Casad, supra note 9, at 1600.  For example, fairness does not explain 
why a federal court can reach outside the forum’s territorial boundaries to exert 
jurisdiction when a state court cannot, such as under the bulge rule.  Id.  Other factors limit 
state jurisdiction, and these factors are irrelevant to federal courts in federal question cases.  
Id.  Therefore, the Fifth Amendment does not require minimum contacts with a state.  Id.  
Another proposition is that contacts with the nation as a whole may not satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment, but contact with the state where the federal court sits is also not required.  Id. 
at 1601; see also Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 
1974).  However, this view creates additional problems in analyzing the same fairness 
factors required by International Shoe.  Casad, supra note 9, at 1603.  One possible solution 
would be to adjust venue requirements to handle situations of substantial unfairness.  Id. 
146 Erichson, supra note 39, at 1156 n.249; see CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, § 1:07; supra 
Part II.A. 
147 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
148 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) (1963), advisory committee notes; HAZARD & TARUFFO, supra 
note 33, at 177 (noting that although Congress created the federal courts in 1789 and 
provided that they should use the same methods of process as the states, the permissible 
forms of federal process have expanded over time in various situations to provide for 
nationwide service of process); supra Part II.B. 
149 Erichson, supra note 39, at 1156 n.249; see CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, § 1:07. 
150 Erichson, supra note 39, at 1156 n.249. 
151 See Warren B. Chick, International Law and Technology: U.S. Jurisdictional Rules of 
Adjudication over Business Conducted via the Internet—Guidelines and a Checklist for the E-
Commerce Merchant, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 243, 250-51 n.28 (noting that International 
Shoe responded to communication and transportation technological advancements of the 
1940s). 
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today.152  Between the time International Shoe was decided, when the 
FRCP had only existed for six years, and today, many changes in 
technological capabilities, transportation, and communication have 
influenced society, the Advisory Committee, and the Supreme Court.153  
Evidence of these changes is even visible in the federal courts through 
the implementation of on-line filing, the use of electronic discovery, and 
service by electronic mail.154  The next step in the Rules is to account for 
these technological advancements in obtaining jurisdiction.155 
B. Supreme Court Trends Demonstrate the Expansion of Jurisdiction Based on 
Technological Advancements  
Technology has progressed so that alternative methods of 
communication, including electronic mail and the Internet, have 
surpassed the traditional limitations of geographical boundaries, 
resulting in increased interstate activities and commerce.156  Supreme 
Court cases, which altered jurisdiction analysis as technology developed 
and noted the increasing nationalization of commerce, modern 
transportation, and communication, illustrate the trend of technology 
operating to relax due process limits on jurisdiction. 157  As demonstrated 
by this trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence, defendants need less 
protection from litigation by the federal Constitution because federal 
forums are more easily accessible.158   
With each of the Supreme Court’s many references to technological 
changes throughout its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, some major 
technological advancement had occurred.159  As a result of the 
advancement, the defendant’s unfairness argument was substantially 
                                                 
152 See Nguyen, supra note 1, at 273.  Compare supra text accompanying notes 41-43, with 
supra text accompanying Part II.C. 
153 See supra notes 57-114. 
154 See supra Part II.C.  For a discussion of video depositions and other technology used 
by courts, see Rebecca White Berch, A Proposal to Amend Rule 30(B) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: Cross-Disciplinary and Empirical Evidence Supporting Presumptive Use of Video 
to Record Depositions, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (1990); see FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b) (permitting 
video depositions).  The Rules have also provided for service by electronic mail when other 
means of service are ineffective.  See supra note 119. 
155 See infra Part IV. 
156 See supra Part II.C. 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 57-89. 
158 See supra Part II.B. 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 57-89 (tracing the development of the personal 
jurisdiction analysis and technology). 
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weakened.160  The development of the Internet is another such 
technological change. 
A court should rarely determine that it is too unfair to bring a 
defendant into a forum because current technology available to 
defendants eases traditional concerns regarding court accessibility.161  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has been narrowing the unfairness 
prong of the test since International Shoe when it first used technology to 
expand boundaries beyond those of the defendant’s state.162  Since then, 
although state boundaries, as a proxy for geographic convenience, have 
been considered in the personal jurisdiction analysis for state-court 
jurisdiction, they have not completely limited jurisdiction since 
Pennoyer.163  Moreover, caselaw demonstrates that even where it may 
seem unfair to bring a defendant into a forum, unfairness alone is 
insufficient—exercising jurisdiction must be so unfair as to deny due 
process.164   
Recent decisions such as Burger King and Asahi also point to 
determining the fairness question as a function of mobility, which is an 
area of continued technological advancement.165  However, the problem 
with the Burger King approach is that it went too far; by operating as a 
sliding-scale, it disregarded the purposeful availment requirement, 
which is clearly required according to other Supreme Court personal 
jurisdiction cases.166  Even so, Burger King illustrates that as early as the 
1980s, the Supreme Court was reluctant to find unfairness to the 
defendant because of the technological advancements available.167   
Despite this reluctance, it seems reasonably clear that defendants 
have some due process rights in personal jurisdiction inquiries, as 
                                                 
160 See supra notes 57-89. 
161 Heiser, supra note 55, at 935-36.  For example, defendants need not travel to the 
courthouse to file paperwork, and electronic discovery is available to ease pretrial travel.  
Moreover, very few cases are actually tried in federal court. 
162 See supra notes 57-89 and accompanying text. 
163 See supra note 57-89 and accompanying text; see also Charles W. Adams, World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson—The Rest of the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122, 1153 (1993).  But see 
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980), which noted that even if the 
defendant would suffer no inconvenience from litigating in another forum, and even if the 
forum had a strong interest, jurisdiction could violate due process.  Therefore, World-Wide 
Volkswagen suggests that in state-court jurisdiction, state boundaries should be considered 
regardless of geographical convenience.  Adams, supra, at 1153. 
164 See supra notes 63-69. 
165 Supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. 
166 See supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text. 
167 Supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
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illustrated by Asahi.168  However, the facts of Asahi are easily 
distinguished from the other Supreme Court cases referring to 
technology and expanding jurisdiction.169  Indeed, at least some of the 
factors considered in the fairness inquiry did not involve the defendants 
at all but rather concerned the state’s diminished interest in the outcome 
of the case.170   
Although Asahi demonstrates that due process for the defendant 
cannot be stretched beyond limits, inconvenience to plaintiffs should be 
considered as well.171  For example, when a plaintiff is an injured person 
and the defendant is a corporation, by requiring plaintiffs to sue the 
corporation where it resides, the inconvenience and burdens are placed 
on plaintiffs who may deserve a remedy and be unable to seek one due 
to costs associated with the time and expense of litigation.172  While 
McGee is the only Supreme Court case demonstrating this notion, there 
the plaintiff’s interests trumped the defendant’s fairness argument 
because any inconvenience the defendant suffered did not divest the 
state of jurisdiction.173 
Likewise, although various factors are considered in the fairness 
inquiry, the connection between fairness to the defendant and 
technology is evident and central to the question.174  The Supreme 
Court’s pattern of expanding jurisdiction based on the notion that 
advanced technology eases accessibility to the forum supports a further 
jurisdictional expansion based on new technological advancements.175  
The CM/ECF System has the capability of easing burdens on defendants 
litigating in distant forums by making the forums more accessible.176  A 
more accessible forum increases fairness in asserting jurisdiction beyond 
state boundaries because defending is less burdensome.177 
                                                 
168 Supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text. 
169 Supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra notes 87-89. 
171 Compare Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987), and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 251 (1958), with McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
172 See supra notes 74-81 (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen). 
173 See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text (discussing McGee). 
174 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (discussing Asahi). 
175 See supra Part II.A (describing the expansion of personal jurisdiction doctrine by the 
Supreme Court due to technological advancements). 
176 See supra Part II.C (describing the CM/ECF system). 
177 See supra Part II.A (describing Supreme Court cases which expand jurisdiction because 
it is not “too unfair” to assert jurisdiction in the context of then-current technology). 
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C. Amendments to the Rules Have Led to Expanding Jurisdiction Beyond 
State Boundaries 
Just as the Supreme Court has recognized that state lines are 
inadequate as a proxy for jurisdiction over the past several years, so has 
Advisory Committee.178  The Committee’s specific contemplation of 
technological and transportation advancements when amending Rule 4 
to include the “bulge rule” demonstrates this recognition.179  The 
Advisory Committee should again amend Rule 4 so that it reflects 
defendants’ ease of access to the Internet and courts’ abilities to utilize 
electronic filing.  
Although clear sovereign power is needed to exercise jurisdiction, 
federal courts can reach beyond state sovereignty when authorized by a 
statute, such as Rule 4.180  Therefore, due process limits based on 
territorial principles of state sovereignty do not bind federal courts 
because Congress can authorize service of process in any part of the 
United States for suits brought pursuant to federal law.181  For example, 
the Federal Interpleader Act authorizes nationwide service to confer 
jurisdiction, and its passage demonstrates that state boundaries are not 
required as definite borders before exercising jurisdiction.182  Likewise, 
the bulge rule demonstrates that state boundaries do not limit federal 
jurisdictional power.183  The bulge rule cases hold that the defendant’s 
                                                 
178 See supra Part II.B. 
179 See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text (discussing the committee’s reasons for 
including the bulge rule and its implications). 
180 See supra notes 39, 94 (discussing other statutes that authorize nationwide federal 
jurisdiction and Rule 4, respectively). 
181 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. Although Congress rejected the 
proposed 1989 amendment to the FRCP, providing for nationwide jurisdiction in all federal 
question cases, Congress has provided for the federal courts to exercise nationwide 
jurisdiction in specific instances.  See supra note 39. 
182 See supra note 39 (identifying federal statutes with nationwide service provisions). 
The interpleader statute allows a party who may be exposed to multiple claims for money 
or property in the party’s possession to settle the dispute in a single proceeding.  See 
COUND ET AL., supra note 18, at 656.  It permits nationwide service of process so that all 
claimants may be joined.  Id. at 664.  Further, the stake must only be worth five hundred 
dollars for interpleader jurisdiction.  Id.  The interpleader statute also requires only 
minimal diversity, or diversity of citizenship between two or more claimants, without 
regard to adverse co-claimants citizens of the same state.  Id. at 672; see also State Farm & 
Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).  Some courts have limited jurisdiction under 
the interpleader statute because of the small federal interest and remedial function of the 
Act.  David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 56 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 47 (1987); see also Hagan v. Cent. Ave. Dairy, Inc., 180 F.2d 502, 503 (9th 
Cir. 1950) (dismissing a cross-claim although it arose under the same transaction because it 
impermissibly expanded jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Act). 
183 See supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. 
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contacts with the forum state are entirely irrelevant to a court’s 
constitutional exercise of jurisdiction, so long as the defendant has 
sufficient contacts with the bulge area.184   
Technological advancements make possible many improvements in 
the judicial system, and they often affect society so that changes in the 
law must reflect new technology if the law is to continue to serve its 
purpose.185  As before, technological advancements have led to the 
ability to further expand jurisdiction.186  Because of the current 
technology available for communication and litigation, due process 
violations should rarely occur.187  As a result of this decreased likelihood, 
unfairness to a defendant should only defeat personal jurisdiction on an 
individualized basis.188  Therefore, unfairness should not be justified as a 
“broad invalidating rule” that generally requires minimum contacts with 
a geographic area smaller than that of the sovereign entity that created 
the court.189  The Committee needs to consider the most recent 
technological developments, such as electronic filing, in its next set of 
proposed amendments to Rule 4.  Considering the Internet when 
determining the fairness of a forum is the next logical step in personal 
jurisdiction expansion, as it is capable reducing inconvenience in 
defending lawsuits from distant forums. 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION:  INTRODUCING THE 2005 MODEL OF RULE 4  
Rule 4(k) allows the federal courts to establish jurisdiction over a 
person through service.190  However, the current Rule 4(k) does not 
account for current technological advancements, including the Internet.  
This Note proposes an amendment and comment to Rule 4(k).191  The 
proposed amendment enables federal courts to assert nationwide 
personal jurisdiction over defendants in federal question cases in areas 
where the district court uses electronic filing.192  Unlike the Advisory 
Committee’s 1989 proposal, which suggested nationwide jurisdiction in 
                                                 
184 See supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra Part II.A-B and accompanying text discussing the motivations of the rule-
makers when proposing changes to or amending the Federal Rules. 
186 Cf. text accompanying notes 100-04. 
187 See supra Part II.C (discussing current technology available). 
188 Heiser, supra note 55, at 935-36.  This article suggests using a test common to choice-
of-law and personal jurisdiction as announced by the Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance 
Co. v. Hague, 499 U.S. 302 (1981)).  Id. at 937. 
189 Id. at 936. 
190 See supra Part II.B. 
191 See infra Part IV.A. 
192 See infra Part IV.A. 
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all federal question cases,193 this Note’s proposal specifically uses 
technology in amending the rule to provide for such jurisdiction.  It 
proposes that a federal court in a federal question case may have 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the district court in which 
the defendant is sued uses electronic filing.  The jurisdiction is based on 
service and would build on Rule 4(k)(1). 
A. Proposed Amendment 
The following proposed amendment to Rule 4(k) should be 
recommended by the Advisory Committee.  First, Rule 4(k)(1)(A)-(D) 
and (2) should remain unedited.  Then, the new method of obtaining 
jurisdiction should be added as section Rule 4(k)(1)(E). 
    (k)  Territorial Limits of Effective Service. 
(1)  Service of a summons or filing a waiver of service is 
effective to establish jurisdiction over the person of a 
defendant 
(A)  who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court 
of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district 
court is located, or 
(B)  who is a party joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19 and is 
served at a place within a judicial district of the United 
States and not more than 100 miles from the place which 
the summons issues, or 
(C)  who is subject to the federal interpleader jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1335,  
(D)  when authorized by a statute of the United States, 
or 
(E)  when the summons issues from a district where the 
court utilizes electronic filing on a claim arising under 
federal law.  
(2)  If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, serving a 
summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, 
                                                 
193 See supra text accompanying note 106. 
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with respect to claims arising under federal law, to 
establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any 
defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of general jurisdiction of any state.194 
B. Proposed Comment 
The Federal Rules Advisory Committee lists committee notes 
following amendments indicating the motivation for the changes or 
additions in the FRCP.  In explaining the above suggested amendment to 
Rule 4, Subsection (k), paragraph (E) should be added as follows: 
The new section E applies to federal question cases and allows 
for effective service outside of the State in which the action is 
filed when the district court issuing the summons utilizes 
electronic filing.  This is designed to promote the objective of 
enabling courts to determine entire controversies.  In 
consideration of current advancements in technology, which 
facilitates increased communication and less expensive travel, 
the amenability to service in federal question cases would not 
burden the parties summoned. This provision does not affect 
federal venue rules.  It also does not affect the transfer of 
venue statutes.  Therefore, any requirements of subject-matter 
jurisdiction and venue will still have to be satisfied as to the 
parties served.  Also, forum non conveniens remains available 
for foreign defendants who would be severely burdened by the 
jurisdiction.195 
Commentary 
The current Rule 4(k) provides for personal jurisdiction based on 
service of process in five situations:  (1) when a court of that state could 
exercise jurisdiction; (2) within one hundred miles of the court when 
necessary to establish jurisdiction over third parties in impleader or 
joinder; (3) pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act; (4) pursuant to a 
federal statute authorizing nationwide jurisdiction; and (5) in federal 
question cases where there is no jurisdiction over a defendant in any 
single state court.196  The proposed amendment to Rule 4 extends the 
reach of federal courts to account for the widespread Internet usage in 
                                                 
194 The proposed amendment is italicized and is the contribution of the author.  Rule 
4(k)(1)(A)-(D) and (2) is the current language of FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). 
195 The proposed comment is italicized and is the contribution of the author. 
196 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). 
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America today.197  Also, it works with the other federal rules to make 
courts more efficient by allowing them to hear entire controversies.198  
Fairness is still ensured for nonresident defendants because with the 
widespread use of the Internet, the burden of litigating in another state is 
substantially decreased.  Electronic filing allows parties and courts 
immediate access to documents, while electronic and technological 
advancements in discovery can ease burdens of collecting evidence.199   
The proposed amendment operates consistently with previous 
expansions of personal jurisdiction under Rule 4, such as establishing 
personal jurisdiction under the bulge rule.200  Further, this rule is 
consistent with the objectives of the rules, efficiency and enabling courts 
to resolve entire controversies.201  If jurisdictional inquiries are no longer 
necessary, litigation can focus on the merits of cases, saving much time 
and expense.  While this proposed amendment will have the effect of 
nationwide jurisdiction once the federal courts all make electronic filing 
available, technology has led to a need for this development.202  The 
benefit of enacting this proposed amendment would not be instant 
nationwide jurisdiction; instead, it could develop as courts decide to pass 
the necessary local rules utilizing or requiring electronic filing.  Further, 
unlike when the previous nationwide jurisdiction amendment was 
suggested in 1989, technology has now progressed to the point that most 
Americans have access to computers, alleviating fairness concerns.203   
While the use of technology has grown enormously in recent years, 
there will still likely be citizens who are without access to the Internet 
and are therefore inconvenienced.  This problem is temporary and 
transitional.  Internet business transactions are the current trend.  As the 
number of citizens with access to the Internet continues to grow and 
technology continues to develop, any possible unfairness will 
substantially decrease.  Further, other Rules could be amended to 
alleviate any possible unfairness that may occur in the interim period.  
                                                 
197 See supra notes 114-15, 130 (describing the increased use of the Internet by Americans). 
198 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
199 See supra text accompanying notes 116. 
200 See supra Part II.B. 
201 See supra Part II.B. 
202 See supra notes 114-15, 130 (describing the growing use of the Internet). 
203 See supra note 115 (discussing the number of Americans that have access to 
computers). 
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For example, the transfer of venue statutes could be amended to further 
assist inconvenienced defendants.204   
Although a counter-argument will be made in favor of due process 
limitations on jurisdiction, this argument neglects the International Shoe 
line of cases, which established that territorial sovereignty is not an 
absolute limit on a court’s jurisdictional reach and has not been since 
1945.205  Moreover, federal courts do not have to be limited by state 
boundaries because Congress can authorize jurisdiction over parties 
based on contacts with the United States as a whole.206  In addition, 
federal courts are designed to adjudicate federal law.207  Therefore, they 
should be able to exert jurisdiction over parties concerning federal 
issues.      
Likewise, subsequent amendments in the Rules could remedy any 
other potential problems with the proposed amendment to Rule 4.208  
Thus, any amendment to Rule 4 would likely be the first in a series of 
steps needed to fully update the Rules to embrace new technology.  This 
proposed amendment is a compromise between a more radical option,209 
which extends jurisdiction in all cases following interpleader reasoning, 
                                                 
204 The issue is venue, not jurisdiction, after a party is constitutionally in federal court.  
CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 529; see 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000).  It is beyond the scope 
of this Note to discuss how the transfer of venue statutes should be amended to 
accommodate this situation. 
205 See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra note 171 and accompanying text (noting that Federal sovereignty extends 
through the territory of the United States and that the relevant territory for minimum 
contacts is that of the whole United States). 
207 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (providing for federal courts to have subject matter 
jurisdiction over federal question claims); Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc.’s 
Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 2003); Funkhouser v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, 289 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). 
208 It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss other measures that could ease some of 
the difficulties encountered in amending Rule 4.  The Rule 4 amendments are designed to 
be one part of reforming the FRCP. 
209 In the alternative, it could be suggested to format the rule so that when a diversity or a 
federal question claim is brought in federal court the relevant minimum contacts are with 
the United States.  Although that more radical suggestion could remedy the current circuit 
split on the purposeful availment question, that language could also result in substantial 
problems.  For example, in diversity cases, plaintiffs could forum shop to the federal court 
of their choice without the concern of whether the defendant purposefully availed himself 
of the state where the federal court is located.  Thus, the plaintiff would not only select a 
federal forum to avoid jurisdictional problems, but the plaintiff would also select the law of 
the state that is to apply.  Another concern is with judicial resources: If plaintiffs forum 
shop to federal court on diversity cases, federal courts expend their resources deciding 
state law instead of federal law. 
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and a more conservative option,210 which still requires minimum 
contacts within the traditional boundaries of the state where the federal 
district court is located.  The proposed amendment results in fewer 
problems than these other two possibilities and is consistent with 
objectives of the FRCP. 
Moreover, the proposed amendment balances the concerns of 
predictability and reducing forum shopping, and it accounts for 
technology capable of easing the burdens of litigation.  The proposed 
amendment would also promote conserving judicial resources while 
limiting forum shopping by narrowing the scope of its application to 
federal law.  Further, by allowing federal courts using electronic filing to 
assert jurisdiction based on minimum contacts with the United States in 
federal question cases, courts could spend more time on the merits of 
controversies. 
V.  CONCLUSION:  ON THE ROAD AGAIN 
Modern jurisdictional rules are the result of two centuries of 
evolution of personal jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court and the Advisory 
Committee have historically considered advancements in technology to 
extend courts’ jurisdiction.  New developments in technology have again 
led to the need to reconsider fairness issues.  An amendment to Rule 4 
would ensure efficiency in litigation and expanded federal regulatory 
power.  The proposed amendment would follow the International Shoe 
line of cases, by expanding jurisdiction based on technological 
advancements, and it follows de Tocqueville’s notion of the federal 
courts having equal standing with other sovereigns.  Further, this 
proposed amendment is not designed to accommodate due process 
“fairness” concerns.  The fairness inquiry has become irrelevant to due 
process analysis because of the increased accessibility to federal courts.  
Instead, the proposed amendment looks to the sovereignty of federal 
courts and is premised on the idea that the availability of electronic filing 
through the Internet makes jurisdiction fairer to defendants.  It is the first 
                                                 
210 Another possible format for the amendment would be to allow federal courts to 
exercise jurisdiction once the traditional inquiry of whether the defendant purposefully 
availed himself of the state has been met.  No fairness inquiry would be required.  Because 
of electronic filing and widespread use of the Internet, if a defendant has purposefully 
availed himself of the forum state, it seems unlikely that he could show the burden is too 
heavy to litigate there.  Therefore, that more conservative suggestion would only codify the 
current test used by the courts without considering that federal courts can have jurisdiction 
based on a wider range of contacts.  By leaving in place the traditional boundaries used in 
purposeful availment analysis, those of the states, that suggestion would not recognize 
recent advancements in technology. 
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step in a series of amendments that would need to occur in the Rules to 
make the system more efficient in light of current technology, and 
ultimately fairer to parties involved in litigation. 
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